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Abstract 
Making judgments is an important part of everyday life, and overconfidence in these judgments can lead 
to serious consequences. Two potential factors influencing overconfidence are metacognitive awareness, 
or the awareness of one’s own learning, and the hard-easy effect, which states that overconfidence is 
more prevalent in difficult tasks while underconfidence is more prevalent in easy tasks. Overall, we 
hypothesized that participants’ metacognitive awareness would significantly relate to their 
overconfidence levels. Specific hypotheses were that those participants who display higher levels of 
metacognitive awareness will have lower levels of overconfidence, that harder questions will elicit higher 
levels of overconfidence and easy questions will elicit underconfidence (congruent with the hard-easy 
effect), and that the lower range and upper range will on average be equal, with the exact estimate as the 
midpoint. Participants (N = 49) completed a questionnaire containing a set of hard and easy general 
knowledge questions followed by the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. The correlation between 
metacognitive awareness and confidence was negative for hard questions and positive for easy 
questions. Furthermore, the ranges for easy questions were smaller, resulting in more overconfidence, 
and the ranges for the hard questions were larger, resulting in underconfidence, thus, showing the 
opposite of our expected hypotheses. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 Individuals are often overconfident 
in evaluating the correctness of their 
knowledge. Over the years, overconfidence 
has been defined in many ways. 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1977) 
describe overconfidence as “the major 
systematic deviation from perfect 
calibration… an unwarranted belief in the 
correctness of one’s answers” (p. 108). Two 
decades later, Juslin, Winman, and Olsson 
(2000) term overconfidence as “...the mean 
subjective probability assigned to the 
correctness of answers to general knowledge 
items…tends to exceed the proportion of 
correct answers” (p. 384). Our daily lives 
are full of judgment decisions, such as 
which path to take to quickly get to work, 
how much time it will take to complete a 
task, or how much money to save for an 
upcoming event, but not all estimates can be 
completely accurate. Soll and Klayman 
(2004) found that judges who were 80% 
confident in their decisions were only 
correct 48% of the time. In their study, 
participants were asked to answer a numeric 
general knowledge question, such as “how 
tall is the Empire State Building?” Given 
this answer, participants then provided a 
range around their answer such that they 
were at least 80% confident that their range 
included the real answer. Their findings 
show that estimation often leaves room for a 
significant amount of error. Consequences 
can be severe in certain situations involving 
overconfidence. For example, 
overestimating the distance between 
automobiles has the potential to cause an 
accident.  
It has been suggested that 
overconfidence can result from insufficient 
cognitive processing (Sniezek, Paese, & 
Switzer, 1990), information processing 
biases (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1980), or estimations based solely on 
personal experiences (Winman, Hansson, & 
Juslin, 2004). Sniezek et al. (1990) 
portrayed that overconfidence was higher 
when choices were less thought out, and 
participants should be cued to alternatives 
for more accurate choices. Koriat et al. 
(1980) demonstrated that listing 
contradicting reasons for judgment choice 
helped decrease overconfidence, and that 
listing confirmatory reasons (i.e. 
justifications) for their choice increased 
overconfidence. Selective retrieval and 
pulling solely from one’s own experience 
have also been hypothesized as contributors 
to bias, which would in turn lead to 
overconfidence (Winman et al., 2004). In 
this study, we investigated another possible 
factor that may increase or decrease 
overconfidence: metacognitive awareness. 
Metacognition is “the ability to reflect upon, 
understand, and control one’s learning” 
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994, p. 460).  
Metacognition has been the topic of 
a large body of research, usually focused on 
the poor calibration of subjects’ judgments 
of their own learning (Koriat & Bjork, 2005; 
2006), which can specifically affect studying 
for student learners (Metcalfe & Finn, 
2008). This idea of metacognitive awareness 
involved in overconfidence levels explored 
in the current study is complimented by a 
concept called grain size, coined by Yaniv 
and Foster (1995). Grain size implies that 
the amount of expertise an individual holds 
about the topic in question will be 
represented in their confidence and the way 
in which their interval answers are 
represented.  For example, “I think the 
answer is in the hundreds” is a much broader 
response than “I think the answer is around 
300”. According to Yaniv and Foster (1995), 
the latter answer would imply a greater 
understanding of the topic compared to the 
first answer.  
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Multiple factors have been found to 
increase overconfidence in judgments, such 
as the availability of information (Oskamp, 
1965) and the level of difficulty (Juslin et 
al., 2000). The hard-easy effect illustrates 
these factors and alludes to an effect 
between over/underconfidence and task 
difficulty. Overconfidence is more prevalent 
in difficult items, whereas underconfidence 
appears more in easy items. Therefore, the 
more difficult a question, the more likely the 
responder will limit their answer range, 
implying a higher level of confidence. The 
present study considered the hard-easy 
effect when answering general knowledge 
questions and analyzing data by varying the 
difficulty of items to expand upon the hard-
easy effect with confidence limits. Not only 
do overconfidence levels fluctuate based on 
the difficulty of the question, but 
information processing is also affected by 
how the question is presented.  
Half-range, full-range, and interval 
production formats have all been popular 
designs for general knowledge questions 
(Winman et al., 2004). Half-range refers to a 
question in which the participant is 
presented with a yes or no question and then 
asked to rate their confidence level (0-
100%). A full-range question makes a 
statement and then participants are asked to 
rate the probability of that statement being 
correct (0-100%). Lastly, the interval 
production format includes a question in 
which a number is the answer (i.e., What is 
the population of Japan?), and the 
participant must give a lower limit and 
upper limit (1 million to 10 million people). 
The participant must also assign a level of 
confidence to their answer (0-100%).  Of the 
three, interval production format creates the 
highest levels of overconfidence followed 
by the full-range and half-range formats 
(Winman et al., 2004).  
 
For the present study, we focused on 
interval style questions to create the largest 
opportunity for overconfidence. 
Overconfidence was assessed using 
intervals: by subtracting an exact estimate 
from a lower and upper estimate for each 
participant. This procedure gave us estimate 
ranges for each question. Overconfidence 
resulted when the ranges were small, and 
underconfidence resulted when ranges were 
high. For example, if a person estimated that 
the cost of their car repairs would be $500 
with a range of $450 – $550, their 
confidence range would be 50 points for the 
upper and lower limit of the car repairs. This 
range would be overconfident in comparison 
to a range of $300 – $700, which has a 
confidence range of $200 (underconfident).  
Soll and Klayman (2004) explored 
multiple interval formats where confidence 
levels were evaluated, including one-point 
and two-point formats. One-point format 
requires the participant to form one 
statement in which they choose a lower 
estimate and upper estimate, creating a 
range where the possible answer lies (“I am 
90% sure that this happened between ___ 
and ___”). Two-point format requires the 
participant to create two separate statements 
(I am 80% sure that this happened before            
____. I am 80% sure that this happened after   
_ ). In one-point format, participants 
demonstrated 41% average overconfidence. 
In two-point format, participants 
demonstrated lower overconfidence at 23%. 
Therefore, the two-point format lowered 
overconfidence levels by creating a range of 
values that participants were at least 80% or 
90% confidence included the exact answer 
for the general knowledge question. The 
current study emphasized Soll and 
Klayman’s two-point format with an added 
variable. We included an “exact guess” in 
which the participant made an estimate as to 
what the true answer was; which in turn 
created a lower limit range (lower answer to 
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the exact answer) and an upper limit range 
(exact answer to the upper limit). For this 
study, we implemented Soll and Klayman’s 
two-point format because it was comprised 
of two separate statements, and this 
encouraged participants to sample their 
knowledge twice (once for lower and once 
for upper limits). This format fed into the 
metacognitive awareness we wished to 
explore. Presenting multiple opportunities 
for the participant to examine their 
experiences and knowledge to answer the 
questions allowed more chances to exercise 
their metacognition. 
In the present study, we explored the 
relationship between over/underconfidence 
levels and the participants’ level of specified 
metacognitive awareness. We used a general 
knowledge questionnaire, created by the 
investigators of this study, requiring answers 
in the form of intervals, as described above. 
Participants also completed the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994). In addition to 
assessing overconfidence and 
metacognition, we will be addressing the 
relationship between overconfidence and 
question difficulty. Using the interval format 
allowed us to create a lower range and an 
upper range (lower estimate to exact 
estimate and exact estimate to upper 
estimate), which enabled us to detect any 
trends in the range ratios.  
Overall, we hypothesized that 
participants’ metacognitive awareness 
would significantly relate to their 
overconfidence levels. For example, an 
individual with higher metacognitive 
awareness would have lower levels of 
overconfidence because they may not 
restrict their estimate range, while an 
individual with lower metacognitive 
awareness would have higher levels of 
overconfidence because they may restrict 
their estimates to smaller ranges. We 
assumed that those who are more 
metacognitively aware would have a better 
ability to estimate answers with 
understanding and consideration of the 
accuracy and restrictions of their knowledge. 
Three specific hypotheses were constructed 
for this experiment. First, those participants 
who display higher levels of metacognitive 
awareness will have lower levels of 
overconfidence (assessed by correlation 
analyses).  Second, we expect, congruent 
with the hard-easy effect, that harder 
questions will elicit higher levels of 
overconfidence and easy questions will elicit 
underconfidence. Lastly, the lower range 
and upper range will on average be equal, 
with the exact estimate as the midpoint, 
which will be assessed with ANOVA on the 
estimates and confidence ranges.   
 
METHODS  
 
Participants 
 Forty-nine undergraduate students 
(nine males and forty females) at Missouri 
State University participated in this 
experiment to satisfy a course requirement 
(Introduction to Psychology, PSY 121). 
Participants ranged from 18 to 34 years old. 
The majority of participants were 18 or 19 
years old (85.7%), and 35 freshman 
(71.4%), 11 sophomores (22.4%), and three 
juniors (6.1%) participated in the 
experiment.  
Measures 
 Participants completed two 
measures, a general knowledge 
questionnaire and the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory (Schraw & Dennison, 
1994). The researchers constructed the 
questionnaire on Qualtrics.com, a survey 
management site, for the participants to 
access. It consisted of nine easy general 
knowledge questions and nine hard general 
knowledge questions, which are included in 
Appendix A. This questionnaire was 
developed by searching for and creating 
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trivia style questions that an average person 
might be able to answer. They were sorted 
into easy and hard questions based on 
feedback from pilot testing. Twenty-five 
undergraduate students at Missouri State 
University pilot tested the 30 general 
knowledge questions, prior to the 
experiment, to confirm difficulty level. The 
percent correct for each question was 
calculated and the nine hardest and nine 
easiest questions were included in the 
experiment questionnaire. Each question 
was designed to solicit a number as the 
answer, with the ability to create a range of 
estimates around that number. Researchers 
considered the answers correct if they were 
within three numbers above or below the 
correct answer. The final survey questions 
can be found in Appendix A. The entire 
survey can be found at https://osf.io/ept3c/, 
along with the IRB, data, and analysis files. 
 Participants provided a range of 
answers to each general knowledge 
question, a lower limit, exact estimate, and 
upper limit. For example, the participant was 
asked, “How many feet apart are major 
league baseball bases?” The answer is 90 
feet. Therefore, the student stated the lowest 
possible answer they thought it could be, 
possibly 50 feet (lower limit), an estimate of 
the true answer, possibly 90 feet (exact 
estimate), and the highest possible answer 
they thought it could be, possibly 130 feet 
(upper limit). These questions were ordered 
randomly for each participant to account for 
ordering effects. 
 After completing the general 
knowledge questionnaire, the participants 
completed the Metacognitive Awareness 
Inventory (MAI). The MAI is a 52-question 
self-report survey that assesses the ways one 
strategizes, thinks, and understands their 
learning. These questions were presented as 
statements such as, “I draw pictures or 
diagrams to help me understand while 
learning.” The MAI presents each self-report 
item as a True/False statement. Participants 
completed the 52 statements in the order 
intended by the original authors.  The 52 
statements comprised two subcategories: 
knowledge of cognition and regulation of 
cognition. Knowledge of cognition refers to 
participants’ knowledge about themselves, 
strategies, and situations when said 
strategies are useful. Examples of 
knowledge of cognition statements in the 
MAI are “I understand my intellectual 
strengths and weaknesses” and “I try to use 
strategies that have worked in the past” 
(Schraw & Dennison 1994). Regulation of 
cognition relates to students’ understanding 
of the way they plan, monitor, and evaluate 
their learning, and the way they apply 
strategies. Examples of regulation of 
cognition statements in the MAI are: “I ask 
myself questions about the material before I 
begin” and “I change strategies when I fail 
to understand”. 
 Schraw and Dennison (1994) 
found this two-component model to be 
valid. The internal consistency of these 
scales ranged from .88 to .93. Schraw and 
Dennison also found that while knowledge 
and regulation of cognition were represented 
in the MAI, both of these components 
function independently of one another, each 
making a unique contribution to cognition.  
 
Procedure 
 Participants registered for this 
experiment through Missouri State 
University’s SONA-system. The experiment 
was held in a computer lab, implemented on 
a standard PC, and it lasted between 10 and 
25 minutes (depending on participants’ 
speed of completion). Once participants 
registered for a timeslot, they arrived at the 
computer lab and the primary investigator 
prompted the students. The investigator 
requested the participants refrain from using 
electronic devices, such as their cellular 
phones, during the experiment, to prevent 
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the students from looking up the answers to 
the general knowledge questions. The 
investigator wrote the URL to the Qualtrics 
survey on the board at the front of the room, 
and the participants entered the web address 
in an internet browser.  
 Upon opening the survey, a 
consent form was presented. If participants 
selected “Yes”, the survey proceeded to the 
18 general knowledge questions and the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI), 
but if the student chose “No,” they were 
directed to an end-of-survey prompt and 
thanked for their time. For the students who 
continued with the survey after the consent 
form, the 18 general knowledge questions 
were randomly presented one at a time. 
Students were asked to enter a lower-limit, 
exact answer, and upper-limit as described 
in Materials. After completion of the general 
knowledge questionnaire, the students were 
asked to complete the 52-item self-report 
MAI.  
 Students who completed the 
experiment were asked to follow a link to an 
independent survey on Qualtrics and enter 
their first and last names. The names on the 
independent survey allowed the 
investigators to give credit to the students 
for their Introduction to Psychology (PSY 
121) course without compromising their 
anonymity. Students were emailed 
debriefing information following the 
experiment. 
  
RESULTS  
 
Data Processing 
 All estimates were recoded to 
standardized estimates across questions by 
dividing each estimate (lower, exact, upper) 
by the correct answer. Therefore, if a 
participant’s estimate was equivalent to the 
correct answer, their standardized estimate 
would equal 1. Estimates below the correct 
answer were less than 1, and estimates 
higher than the correct answer were greater 
than 1. Next, the investigators created 
confidence levels for the lower estimates 
and upper estimates by subtracting the exact 
estimate from each one. This procedure 
created estimate ranges where low scores 
indicated overconfidence and high scores 
indicated underconfidence. Overconfidence 
was found in narrow ranges, implying the 
participant limited their answers. 
Conversely, underconfidence was found in 
broad ranges, implying the participants 
created ranges excessively beyond the scope 
of possible correct answers.  
 Extreme estimates were eliminated,  
as identified by examining a histogram of 
the standardized estimate scores. For 
instance, 6500 as a standardized estimate 
was not used in analysis. Average scores for 
each participant for estimates, (lower, exact, 
upper) and confidence levels (lower, upper 
ranges) were created by averaging across 
easy and hard questions separately.  
 The MAI was scored by totaling the 
questions for knowledge and regulation of 
cognition separately according to Schraw 
and Dennison’s scoring guidelines. See 
Table 1 for means, standard deviations, 
minimums, and maximums.  
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 Correlation of Confidence with 
Metacognition 
When analyzing metacognitive awareness 
and its predictive ability to estimate 
overconfidence levels, no significant 
correlation was found between MAI 
subscales and confidence levels (see Table 2 
for r and p-values). Interestingly, 
metacognitive awareness for hard questions 
resulted in negative correlations while easy 
questions resulted in positive correlations. 
This finding shows that, for easy questions, 
participants whose metacognitive awareness 
was higher also had larger ranges, implying 
underconfidence. On hard questions, those 
who had higher levels of metacognitive 
awareness had smaller ranges, implying 
overconfidence. This result was the opposite 
of what we had originally hypothesized.  
 
 
 
 
EASY Knowledge  
about Cognition 
Regulation  
of Cognition 
Lower Limit  .041, p = .780 .176, p = .227 
Upper Limit .111, p = .448 .180, p = .215 
   
HARD 
  
Lower Limit  -.150, p = .305 -.221, p = .127 
Upper Limit -.101, p = .491 -.146, p = .317 
Table 2. Correlation of question difficulty,  
upper and lower limits, and subscales  
of MAI. df = 47. 
 
Average Correct Scores 
A 2 (easy, hard questions) x 3 
(lower, exact, upper estimate) Repeated 
Measures ANOVA addressed the 
correctness of the participants’ answers. We 
found difficulty of the question was 
paralleled by the number of correct answers, 
F(1, 48) = 29.09, p < .001, np
2 = .38. 
Therefore, participants answered easy 
questions (M = 0.90, SE = 0.02) correctly 
more often than hard questions (M = 0.74, 
SE = 0.03), as defined by being closer to 1 
on their standardized estimates. A 
significant effect of correctness for the 
lower, exact, and upper estimates was found, 
F(1, 48) = 116.09, p < .001, np
2
 = .71. The 
investigators analyzed this effect by using 
dependent t-tests to examine the differences 
between lower-exact and exact-upper ranges 
to determine the change in estimate across 
questions. The range from lower (M = 0.67, 
SE = 0.13) to exact (M = 0.84, SE = 0.13) 
differed significantly, t(48) = -10.48, p < 
.001, d = -1.50, as did the range from exact 
to upper (M = 0.95, SE = .18), t(48) = -8.15, 
p = < .001, d = -1.16.  
This finding implies that the 
confidence estimates are different across 
questions and that there was a real and 
varied range around the exact estimate. 
Therefore, the lower, exact, and upper 
estimates were not repeatedly reported as the 
same number or in set patterns (i.e. 
participants did not enter 3, 3, 3, or 10, 11, 
EASY Min Max Mean SD 
Lower Estimate 0.01 0.61 0.20 0.13 
Exact Estimate 0.52 1.17 0.92 0.15 
Upper Estimate 0.01 0.53 0.16 0.11 
Lower Range 0.40 1.08 0.75 0.15 
Upper Range 0.55 1.37 1.03 0.17 
     
HARD Min Max Mean SD 
Lower Estimate 
    
Exact Estimate 0.37 1.30 0.77 0.20 
Upper Estimate 0.03 0.69 0.25 0.15 
Lower Range 0.28 0.99 0.59 0.19 
Upper Range 0.41 1.34 0.86 0.26 
     
Knowledge  
about Cognition 
9 17 13.94 2.23 
Regulation  
of Cognition 
13 34 26.84 4.87 
Table 1. Minimums, maximums, means, and standard  
deviations of easy and hard (lower, exact, upper  
estimates and lower/upper ranges) and knowledge  
about cognition and regulation of cognition.  
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12, as lower, exact, and upper estimates 
consistently across questions). This result 
shows that our manipulation was successful, 
and we were able to analyze over- or 
underconfidence because participants’ 
answers varied from the exact estimate. See 
Figure 1 for the relationship between 
question difficulty and average standardized 
estimate.  
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between average standardized 
lower, exact, and upper estimates and question 
difficulty. 
 
Confidence Ranges 
 To analyze the size of lower ranges 
and upper ranges with easy and hard 
questions, we ran a 2 (easy, hard questions) 
x 2 (lower, upper range) Repeated Measures 
ANOVA. The main effect of easy versus 
hard questions was significant, F(1, 48) = 
7.86, p = .007, np
2= .14. According to this 
analysis, the ranges for easy questions (M = 
0.18, SE = 0.02) were smaller, resulting in 
more overconfidence, and the ranges for the 
hard questions (M = 0.24, SE = 0.02) were 
larger, resulting in underconfidence. This 
result was contrary to our hypothesis. We 
believed that the participants would 
demonstrate consistency with the hard-easy 
effect in that hard questions would elicit 
overconfidence and easy questions would 
elicit underconfidence, but this hypothesis 
was not supported. The main effect of 
confidence range was also significant, F(1, 
48) = 6.05, p = .018, np
2
 = .11. Lower 
confidence ranges overall were larger (M = 
0.23, SE = 0.03) than upper confidence 
ranges (M = 0.19, SE = 0.02). Again, the 
interaction between range confidence size 
and question difficulty was not significant, 
F(1, 48) = .31, p = .580, np
2
 = .01. Figure 2 
shows the means for each.  
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between the average spread of 
lower and upper confidence ranges and question 
difficulty 
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found 
that the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
subscales were not related to participants’ 
level of overconfidence on interval-style 
general knowledge questions. However, 
metacognitive awareness for hard questions 
resulted in a negative correlation, which 
shows that individuals with higher scores on 
the MAI also had smaller ranges, implying 
overconfidence. Furthermore, individuals 
who scored high on the MAI had larger 
ranges for easy questions, resulting in 
underconfidence. This result is the opposite 
of what we hypothesized. We assumed that 
when individuals were more aware of their 
thinking processes, they would create larger 
ranges to encompass all possible answers, 
but in reality the participants with higher 
levels of reported metacognition created 
smaller ranges to questions. Therefore, 
general overconfidence shown by 
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individuals may be more enhanced when an 
individual believes they have more 
metacognitive skills than others. Potentially, 
this result is related to the Dunning-Kruger 
effect in that people are often overconfident 
in their abilities, even when performance is 
low (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
Koriat and Bjork (2005, 2006) 
showed similar results when examining 
judgments of learning, such that people are 
particularly poor at estimating their skills on 
a future test without specific study-test 
practice. Metcalfe and Finn (2008) have 
shown the importance of this research to 
student learners, as the overconfidence in 
judgments influenced their choices to 
continue to study. Therefore, as a person 
learns information, they also judge the 
strength of that learned information. If these 
judgments are overconfident, the person 
may discontinue studying, which could have 
dire consequences for course completion in 
primary and secondary education. Age may 
additionally play a role in these results, as 
our study contained predominately college 
freshman, who may not have had the 
practice and feedback at these types of 
estimations that can help tune them more 
accurately (England & Serra, 2012).  
 Question difficulty was paralleled by 
the number of correct answers. Therefore, 
easy questions were answered correctly 
more often than hard questions. This finding 
was expected based on pilot testing. The 
main effect of easy versus hard questions 
was significant. Easy questions had smaller 
ranges, resulting in overconfidence, and the 
ranges for the hard questions were larger, 
resulting in underconfidence. This result was 
contrary to the hard-easy effect, which we 
thought would apply in this study; however, 
our results can likely be tied to the “better-
than-average” effect in which the hard-easy 
effect can reverse with task difficulty and 
overconfidence (Larrick, Kurson, & Soll, 
2007). The better-than-average effect is 
often found when participants overestimate 
their abilities to perform specific tasks, and 
motivated reasoning (i.e., wanting to view 
oneself in a positive light) has been 
proposed as a likely reason for this effect 
(Taylor & Brown, 1998). These effects are 
important to understand because of their 
relationship to complex decision making, 
such as business takeovers (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999) and employment strikes 
(Babcock & Olson, 1992).  
 In future research, we recommend 
acquiring a larger sample size.  This study 
had a limited participant pool and a short 
time window to collect data. Participants 
may have been potentially uninterested in 
the study because it was required for course 
credit, resulting in less accurate self-report 
results. Our student population is largely 
female, thus driving the larger number of 
female participants. Our results appear to 
represent female students, and further 
studies may wish to investigate if male 
students show a different pattern of results 
with a larger subsample size. This study and 
others in the future can enhance our 
understanding of decision making and what 
factors affect it. The idea that high 
metacognitive awareness would decrease the 
amount of overconfidence in interval style 
questions remains a strong argument in our 
minds, especially as it relates to testing 
environments that students might encounter. 
Increasing people’s awareness of the way 
they analyze questions could allow them to 
recognize that the range may be broader to 
include possible answers in harder 
questions. Creating a novel metacognitive 
awareness assessment tool could be an 
option for finding more reliable results. 
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